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Abstract 
The central importance of conceptualization has been widely recognized. Existing practices 
of conceptualization in the information systems discipline are yet in their genesis. This paper 
first discusses confusion around the notion of “conceptualization”; by drawing from the 
philosophy of science literature, we examine the scientific basis of conceptualization and 
advocate for the importance of construct clarity in conceptualization practice. Previous 
methodological literature paid scant attention to the conduct of conceptualization. Hence, in 
order to counsel researchers on how to conduct conceptualization, this paper develops a set 
of actionable guidelines for researchers to engage more deeply with conceptualization. 
1.  Introduction 
Conceptualization is unarguably important. Kaplan (1964) noted1, 
Concepts, then, mark out the paths by which we may move most freely in logical 
space. They identify nodes or junctions in the network of relationships, termini at 
which we can halt while preserving the maximum range of choice as to where to 
go next. […] When we are told the color of a substance we have learned little, but 
when we are told its chemical composition we have learned a very great deal—all 
the known reactions that depend on that composition. […] The function of 
scientific concepts is to mark the categories which will tell us more about our 
subject matter than any other categorial sets. (Kaplan 1964, p. 52) 
                                                
1 In this paper, we do not differentiate constructs from concepts. 
 A significant concept so groups or divides its subject-matter that it can enter into 
many and important true propositions about the subject-matter other than those 
which state the classification itself. (Kaplan 1964, p. 50) 
Research success hinges to a large extent on proper constructs that deepen our 
understanding of the subject matter. The importance of conceptualization has been 
recognized by information systems (IS) researchers (MacKenzie et al. 2011; Polites et al. 
2012). 
In order to address proper procedures for developing constructs, it is necessary to make 
clear in the first place what conceptualization entails. Based on a survey of ideas in the 
philosophy of science literature, this paper examines the nature of conceptualization. The 
examination is intended to help develop a systematic approach to conceptualization. This 
approach considers decision points where researchers need to pay particular attention in 
conceptualization practices and explores plausible and practical procedures for achieving 
desired outcomes. 
 
 
2.  Defining Conceptualization 
The Webster’s New World College Dictionary (2007) defines the word “conceptualize” as “to 
form a concept or idea of” or “conceive [something in mind]”. Accordingly, conceptualization 
refers to a process of forming a concept or an idea in the mind. This simple definition of 
conceptualization overlaps much with common usage of the term “conceptualization”, but 
differs from how most IS researchers use it. The IS discipline is a diverse research field 
where multiple disciplinary views coexist; this diversity is manifested in multiple 
interpretations and uses of the term “conceptualization”. Before engaging more deeply in 
issues with conceptualization, we next examine several alternative meanings of the term 
“conceptualization” and seek to draw sharp distinctions between these meanings. 
2.1.  Conceptualization in Daily Communication 
Conceptualization (or conceptualize) is not a term used exclusively by scientists. In daily 
communication, it often refers to the forming of an “idea”, where such an “idea” can refer to 
anything. Consider the following excerpt from a news report2 wherein the term 
“conceptualization” is used with reference to the “idea” of creating a start-up company and 
delivering a service through the company. 
The founders [of a start-up company] say that while they launched the service 
this April, the conceptualization [of creating the service] had started in September 
2015. "This concept is pretty famous in the US and was still new to India. We quit 
our day jobs in January 2016 and started working on this full time," says 
Chandrasekaran, who earlier worked at a fintech company.  
A common, but implicit aim in the use of the term “conceptualization” in daily communication 
is to mark the various phases or states of a thing (e.g., a product, a service, a plan). Here 
conceptualization specifically refers to an early stage of the thing, before it has been 
converted to any physical form of existence. For example, one may speak of 
“conceptualization of a novel IT service”, hinting at a lack of specifics of the service. 
Neither the meaning of conceptualization in daily communication nor the implication it is in its 
genesis is adopted by researchers in scientific communications. In other words, 
                                                
2 Retrieved from http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/small-biz/startups/ordooks-do-it-yourself-meal-kits-to-
recreate-gourmet-food-at-home/articleshow/52087202.cms. Last accessed on 3rd May 2016. 
 conceptualizations as used in scientific communication need not “exist only in mind” and the 
thing of focal interest need not always be in its genesis. For example, conceptualizations 
used in scientific communication often have physical existence in papers published in 
journals and thus tend to be more tangible and final. 
2.2.  Conceptualization as Neurocognitive Representation 
In neurocognitive science studies where the fundamental processes of cognition are of focal 
interest, the term “conceptualization” might refer to the formation of neurocognitive 
representations at the level of brain function. Consider the following excerpt (Tucker 1981, p. 
37). 
Human emotion certainly entails cognition of some sort, and research on 
hemispheric specialization may allow the delineation of particular forms of 
neuropsychological organization that are relevant to the conceptualization of an 
emotional experience. 
Hence, at this level of analysis, conceptualization of something in the human brain varies 
according to different kinds of cognitive input (e.g., emotion, reasoning, etc.). Interpretive 
subjectivity across different human individuals is not assumed; instead, this use of the term 
“conceptualization” adopts a natural science view and treats human individuals as identical 
biological subjects. Roughly speaking, understanding conceptualization of something (e.g., 
emotion) requires identification of the relevant parts of the brain as well as the particular 
forms of neurocognitive representations associated with the parts of the brain. The focus of 
understanding conceptualization is then on uncovering possible mechanisms or processes 
through which the relevant parts of the brain and the neurocognitive representations function 
as a whole. 
It is observed that the use of the term “conceptualization” in this sense is rare in IS research, 
given many IS studies have a technical or social and behavioural emphasis. Regardless, it is 
important for IS researchers to be aware of this sense of meaning, given the emergence of 
neurophysiological approaches where brain function has become an important level of 
analysis (e.g., Dimoka 2012; Dimoka et al. 2012; Riedl et al. 2011; Riedl 2010; Dimoka et al. 
2008). For example, Dimoka et al. (2008) showed that the study of brain function might 
support the differentiation of constructs related to technology acceptance and use. 
2.3.  Conceptualization as Representation 
In information science and artificial intelligence related studies, conceptualization might refer 
to a simplified view of some aspects of the world. Extending Genesereth and Nilsson’s 
(1987) work, Gruber (1993, p. 1) noted, 
A body of formally represented knowledge is based on a conceptualization: the 
objects, concepts, and other entities that are presumed to exist in some area of 
interest and the relationships that hold them (Genesereth & Nilsson, 1987). A 
conceptualization is an abstract, simplified view of the world that we wish to 
represent for some purpose. Every knowledge base, knowledge-based system, 
or knowledge-level agent is committed to some conceptualization, explicitly or 
implicitly. […] An ontology is an explicit specification of a conceptualization. 
Conceptualization in this sense thus overlaps much with other terms such as “paradigm”, 
“worldview”, and “ontological or philosophical assumptions” (Gregor 2006; Orlikowski and 
Baroudi 1991). Orlikowski’s (1992) reconceptualization of technology deals primarily with 
research assumptions about the scope of technology and the role technology plays in 
organizational life. 
 The goal of analysing and exposing diverse “conceptualizations” or “philosophical 
assumptions” is widely appreciated in IS research. Orlikowski and Baroudi (1991, p. 24) 
observed, 
What is required is that researchers understand the implications of their research 
perspective, and act in ways that reflect that knowledge. Researchers, however, 
need to be aware of their research traditions and be open to the possibilities of 
other research practices, and not create an orthodoxy which precludes the use or 
publishing of different research. […] Rather, researchers should ensure that they 
adopt a perspective that is compatible with their own research interests and 
predispositions, while remaining open to the possibility of other assumptions and 
interests. They should understand and acknowledge the extent to which the 
perspective they adopt will focus their attention on some things and not others, 
and bias their perception of the phenomena they study. 
2.4.  Conceptualization as Operationalization 
Conceptualization might be referred to as operationalization, especially when an implicit 
operationalism perspective is undertaken. Roughly speaking, operationalism or operationism, 
legitimatizes the practice of defining a construct based entirely on its empirical measures 
(Cook and Campbell 1979; Kaplan 1964). For example, team size might be conceptualized 
as the number of full-time employees of a work team, where the meaning of team size is 
formed only given the existence of the measure of the number of employees.  
Further, the measures of an empirically defined construct should remain unchanged across 
all empirical settings; in other words, where the measures of a construct are modified for a 
particular setting, the construct with modified measures must be a different construct. For 
example, if team size is conceptualized as the number of full-time employees of a team and 
then is used to evaluate a virtual open-source software development team consisting of 
voluntary contributors around the world, the value of team size construct must be zero given 
none are “full-time employees of the team”. A new set of measures and a new construct are 
required. 
When referring to conceptualization as operationalization, one task of the researcher in the 
first instance is to identify measures that are feasible for empirical settings. For example, 
researchers trained in Economics approaches might seek measures that can be associated 
with panel data, such as production data collected by industrial associations and nation-wide 
demographics data. Alternatively, social networks scientists might focus on measures that 
can be produced from vertexes and edges connecting vertexes and thereafter might adopt 
such measures as can be empirically sampled in selected research settings. The drawback 
of this practice is that constructs without obvious or easily identifiable empirical measures 
might be dismissed. Although contrary views exist, the value of constructs that cannot be 
operationalized is also recognized (Osigweh 1989; Kaplan 1964). 
2.5.  Conceptualization as Definition 
To many, if not all researchers, to conceptualize a construct is to provide a definition for the 
construct. MacKenzie (2003, p. 323) referred to conceptualization as “a clear, concise 
conceptual definition of the focal construct(s)”. Put differently, conceptualization requires “the 
identification of what the construct is intended to conceptually represent or capture” 
(MacKenzie et al. 2011, p. 298). A definition is usually a short one-sentence statement that 
articulates the most relevant characteristics of the construct being defined. Such 
characteristics or attributes must be necessary and sufficient for uniquely identifying the 
construct of interest (MacKenzie et al. 2011). Barki et al. (2007) defined individual-level IS 
use-related activity as “the set of behaviours individuals undertake concerning a specific 
task-technology-individual context” (p. 174), where both task and technology are essential for 
 identifying individual-level IS use-related activity. Likewise, Sun (2012) defined features in 
use as “the basket of system features that are ready to be used by a particular user to 
accomplish tasks” (p. 455), where it is essential for system features to be readily available in 
order to satisfy the definition. 
The definition of a construct is used to guide construct operationalization and validation and 
to explain and predict phenomena. Schwab (1980) noted that construct validity is achieved 
through ensuring correspondence between the conceptual definition of a variable and the 
operational procedure to manipulate the variable. If one agrees that theory must contain 
“stories” or explanations regarding why phenomena occur (Gregor 2006), it follows that the 
meaning of a construct, rather than its associated measures alone, must be used to theorize 
phenomena and to help readers understand the theoretical arguments formulated. 
2.6.  Conceptualization as Theorization 
Conceptualization can be used as a surrogate for developing causal hypotheses explicating 
antecedents and consequences of a construct. Some might argue a definition alone cannot 
characterize the entirety of the meaning of a construct. Hence, there is another sense of 
meaning for the term “conceptualization”. Kaplan (1964) argued that concepts emerge from 
theories. When making clear what a concept means, one must rely on a set of assumptions, 
either explicitly or implicitly. Such assumptions are implicit theories about phenomena. To 
define a construct fully, one needs to look at the theory or theories where a construct 
emerges. In short, conceptualization, in Kaplan’s (1964) view, is inseparable from 
theorization. 
Studies that amplify this view commonly appear in “pure theory” articles where the intention 
is to develop a new theoretical perspective that integrates past theories in one or more 
research domains. A new construct often emerges as a result of such a new theoretical 
perspective. Hence, in such a pure theory article, the conceptualization of the new construct 
is usually tightly coupled with the theoretical perspective used to integrate previous theories. 
For example, Adaptive Structuration Theory developed constructs such as structures of 
technology and appropriation of structures through the sociotechnical theoretical perspective 
that integrates Structuration theory and decision-making theory about technology (DeSanctis 
and Poole 1994). 
Another exemplar of conceptualization as theorization is Burton-Jones and Straub’s (2006) 
study of the System Usage construct. They comprehensively reviewed past theories related 
to System Usage and lamented the confusion observed, which resulted from researchers’ 
selectively adopting certain compositional elements of System Usage while neglecting 
others. In order to conceptualize System Usage systematically, they recommended that both 
the antecedents and consequences of System Usage in a nomological network must be 
thoroughly addressed. 
2.7.  Conceptualization as Clarification 
Conceptualization might also be conceived as clarification of a set of confusing and 
potentially ambiguous concepts. Conceptualization in this sense primarily refers to efforts to 
identify the commonalities and differences across a broad range of existing concepts. Such 
conceptualization work is commonplace in the form of “review articles” that are intended to 
present a summary of existing meanings of a construct and to develop a new conceptual 
framework that integrates and harmonizes existing meanings in a research domain (Rivard 
2014; Webster and Watson 2002).  
For example, Malone and Crowston (1994) proposed an interdisciplinary framework to 
organize past studies on “coordination” according to the basic forms of coordination 
processes and conceptualized “coordination” as “managing dependencies between 
activities”. Their inclusive conceptualization of coordination is intended to clarify a set of 
 specific notions of coordination. Hence, their conceptualization of coordination on its own 
would be empty without further reference to specific notions of coordination. Burton-Jones 
and Straub’s (2006) effort to clarify previous concepts related to System Usage is another 
example. Their insightful analysis yielded a framework that consists of the elements of 
System Usage including: usage, user, task, and system. Previous related concepts in the 
literature can thus be mapped onto their framework. 
 
 
3.  Fundamental of Scientific Conceptualization 
Although one can use the term “conceptualization” with whatever meaning one wishes, we 
will focus on a view of conceptualization that is of primary interest to IS researchers. We 
define conceptualization as the practice of communicating the meaning of a construct to an 
intended audience. 
3.1.  Epistemic Empiricism 
Although conceptualization may be entirely private to a person (i.e., depicting imaginary 
objects or things in one’s mind), conceptualization as discussed here depends either directly 
or indirectly on “experience”. This “experience” should be interpreted broadly as perception 
of the external, empirical world. The reason for the dependence is that “appropriate action on 
things depends on experience of them: only empirical knowledge provides a basis for 
successful action” (Kaplan 1964, p. 35). This doctrine is known as epistemic empiricism: “we 
cannot know without depending somewhere on experience” (Kaplan 1964, p. 36). 
Depending on the particular ways in which empirical evidence provides a basis for the 
meaning of a construct, three schools of thought can be differentiated: logical positivism, 
operationalism (or operationism), and pragmatism. The three schools of epistemic 
empiricism led to distinctive approaches to conceptualization.  
Logical positivism advocates that the meaning of a construct can be independently verified; 
hence, researchers need to search for “true” constructs that are on their own verified against 
empirical evidence (Godfrey-Smith 2003). However, researchers have realized that it is 
impossible to verify the meaning of a construct without relying more or less on a set of other, 
often implicit assumptions; this failure led to the abandonment of logical positivism (Godfrey-
Smith 2003). Logical positivism is now rarely practiced in conceptualization. 
Operationalism advocates for defining the meaning of a construct based on operational 
procedures that are used to assess it (Godfrey-Smith 2003; Kaplan 1964). The rationale of 
operationalism is that 
To each concept [construct] there corresponds a set of operations [operational 
procedures] involved in its scientific use. To know these operations [operational 
procedures] is to understand the concept [construct] as fully as science requires; 
without knowing them, we do not know what the scientific meaning of the concept 
[construct] is, nor even whether it has a scientific meaning. Thus operationism 
[operationalism] provides, not just a criterion of meaningfulness, but a way of 
discovering or declaring what meaning a particular concept [construct] has: we 
need only specify the operations [operational procedures] that determine its 
application. Intelligence, in the famous dictum, is what is measured by 
intelligence tests. (Kaplan 1964, p. 40) 
For example, the ease of use of a technology might be assessed through asking users a set 
of questions in one empirical setting, but alternatively through observing how users use the 
technology to perform certain tasks in another empirical setting. According to operationalism, 
 these two sets of operational procedures would define two utterly different constructs. The 
primary drawback of operationalism is that it might obscure insights that could have been 
otherwise gained from considering two constructs to be the same if they yield similar 
theoretical implications, though operationalized differently (Kaplan 1964).  
[…] science must allow for the possibility of the same concept [construct] 
being measured or applied on the basis of totally different operations 
[operational procedures] […]. Present estimates of what is misleadingly called 
“the age of the universe” are of the order of six billion years or so; what makes 
this figure of scientific interest is that about a dozen different lines of inference 
from correspondingly different observational data lead to substantially the same 
magnitude. Operationally we should have to say that twelve different “ages” are 
in question. Even though in these terms [constructs] it would remain of scientific 
interest that they all have approximately the same numerical value, the 
significance of this fact would be obscured. We should like to be able to 
say that it is because they all measure the same thing, and this statement is 
precisely what operationism [operationalism] must deny. But the objection is far 
from conclusive. (Kaplan 1964, p. 41, emphasis added) 
Moreover, there is value in using constructs that are associated only indirectly with empirical 
evidence (such constructs are called “theoretical constructs”, introduced as follows). To 
define such a construct, one first needs to define a set of other related constructs that 
emerge from the same theory; thus, fully defining such constructs based on their operational 
procedures is often unachievable. Operationalism underplays the value of such constructs. 
Operationalism encourages the practice of studying phenomena motivated primarily by new 
approaches to operationalizing constructs and acquiring data. For instance, researchers may 
use some network measures of interpersonal email communication frequencies to study IT 
use, even when the conceptual meanings of such measures are not fully understood. 
Different from logical positivism and operationalism, pragmatism emphasizes implications 
deriving from the meaning of a construct. Kaplan (1964) noted, 
The meaning of the statement [a construct] lies in these implications, and, as 
William James put it, a difference [in the meanings of a construct] which makes 
no difference [in prescribed actions] is no difference. […] The pragmatic 
approach [to the meaning of a construct] is prospective; what counts is not 
origins but outcomes, not the connections with experience antecedently given but 
those which are yet to be instituted. […] A statement [a construct] is meaningful if 
it can enter into the making of a decision, and its meaning is analyzable in terms 
of the difference it makes to the decision taken. […] For the pragmatist the 
question is, “What would we do if we did believe it?” To believe a proposition is 
not to lay hold of an abstract entity called “truth” with a correspondingly abstract 
“mind”; it is to make a choice among alternative sets of strategies of action. 
(Kaplan 1964, pp. 42 – 43) 
With a focus on prescribed actions, pragmatism links the meaning of a construct to empirical 
evidence through referencing to the empirical settings in which the prescribed actions are 
enacted. Kaplan (1964) further suggested, 
If meanings are to be analyzed in terms of action, they must make reference 
sooner or later to the ordinary objects and situations which provide the locus for 
action. […] Every scientific language, however technical, is learned and used by 
way of the common language of everyday life; it is that everyday language to 
which we inevitably turn for the clarification of scientific meanings. (Kaplan 1964, 
p. 45) 
Pragmatism encouraged the development and use of constructs that are not operationally 
defined. For instance, it is considered legitimate to develop constructs such as appropriation 
of technology (DeSantis and Poole 1994) and functional affordances (Markus and Silver 
 2008) without a good way to operationalize them. What matters most is that such constructs 
can inform practical actions. 
3.2.  Criterion of Conceptualization: Construct Clarity 
In addition to the scientific basis of conceptualization, it is also important to know what 
criteria should be used to assess conceptualization. Irrespective of the particular approach to 
conceptualization, construct clarity is crucially important. Clear constructs “distill phenomena 
into sharp distinctions that are comprehensible to a community of researchers” (Suddaby 
2010, p. 346). Van de Ven (2007, p. 116) noted “what makes definitions of terms [constructs] 
significant is that they classify the universe into ways that are critical to a theory”. A clearly 
defined construct is able to delineate the boundary conditions of what phenomena are 
included and what are not included in a theory (Weber 2012).  
To gain a deeper understanding of construct clarity, it might be useful to examine the issue 
from the perspective of communication, in which the Theory of Communication plays a 
critical role. Construct clarity might be understood as the accuracy or quality of delivering 
information from a sender to intended receivers, where the categories for distinguishing 
phenomena represent the message being communicated. According to Communication 
Theory (Weaver 1953), the quality of communication can be analysed at three hierarchical 
levels. At the technical level, high quality communication requires that symbols, signals, or 
patterns comprising the message communicated travel freely and accurately from a sender 
to a receiver. Accordingly, construct clarity at the technical level must ensure the “materials” 
that are used to convey the meaning of a construct (e.g., written words, illustrative figures, 
vocal sounds in oral discourse, etc.) are successfully delivered to intended receivers with 
minimum distortion or bias. Construct clarity at the technical level may thus be improved 
through sophistication of oral pronunciation in an increasingly global environment as well as 
advancement of digital technologies, printing technologies, and recording devices and 
mediums.  
At the semantic level, high quality communication requires “the identity, or satisfactorily close 
approximation, in the interpretation of meaning by the receiver, as compared with the 
intended meaning of the sender” (Weaver 1953, p. 2). Construct clarity at the semantic level 
considers whether the categories elucidated by a construct are interpreted as exactly the 
same between the creator of the construct and the various intended audience cohorts. 
Apparently, the particular language used, the grammatical rules authors follow, and even the 
alternative spellings preferred might influence the likely degree of construct clarity at the 
semantic level. More importantly, it is necessary that the creator of a construct and all the 
users of the construct agree upon the categories of phenomena that are identified by the 
construct. 
At the effectiveness level, the quality of communication is concerned with “the success with 
which the meaning conveyed to the receiver leads to the desired conduct” (Weaver 1953, p. 
2). Construct clarity at the effectiveness level examines the proposition to what extent a 
construct leads to successful actions after using the construct. Such actions may include 
theory building and testing, and business and managerial practices guided by the construct. 
Although construct clarity at all three levels deserves attention, we focus primarily on 
construct clarity at the semantic level, and therefore consider technical clarity as the basis or 
antecedent of construct clarity, and effectiveness as the desired outcome or consequence of 
construct clarity. Technical clarity deserves attention to issues such as linguistic or 
presentation styles. Although such issues are important, we do not address them in this 
paper. Further, as construct clarity at the effectiveness level is the ultimate goal, it must be 
taken into consideration when examining construct clarity at the semantic level. However, it 
is impossible to anticipate all the possible uses of a construct or a conceptualization. Hence, 
it is unnecessarily restrictive to dictate the particular ways in which a construct achieves 
construct clarity at the effectiveness level, but, instead, we presume the presence of a goal 
that is intended to ensure construct clarity at the effectiveness level. 
 Furthermore, construct clarity also differs from construct validity. Regardless of its variants, 
construct validity is concerned with “the correspondence between a construct and the 
operational procedure to measure or manipulate that construct” (Schwab 1980, pp. 5 – 6). 
Although diverse epistemological views exist (see the previous section), many would agree 
that construct validity must have some emphasis on a construct’s verification or verifiability 
with empirical evidence, either directly or indirectly. This emphasis draws a sharp distinction 
between construct clarity and construct validity. 
In sum, although construct clarity is a basis for construct validity and usefulness, it is 
separate from both. Failure to achieve construct clarity prevents researchers from achieving 
construct validity (MacKenzie et al. 2011) and also restricts the potential usefulness of a 
construct. 
However, several issues associated with construct clarity may arise from the process of 
conceptualization (Kaplan 1964), as summarized in Table 1. Given these issues, constructs 
always remain open to further discrimination or in some sense “infinitely unclear”. Given this 
nature of reality, construct clarity must be pragmatically addressed with an eye to the needs 
of investigation. 
 
Table 1. Major Issues Associated with Construct Clarity 
Issue Explanation Example 
Empirical issue: The 
meaning of a construct 
cannot be fully 
specified before the 
construct is used, 
given ever-present 
borderline cases in 
future empirical 
settings. 
Empirical experience is “a succession of 
continuities, and everything discriminated in the 
continuum has fuzzy edges” (Kaplan 1964, p. 65). 
“Facts are indefinitely indefinite: however fine a 
mesh we use, finer differences slip through the 
conceptual net […] and the more discriminations 
we make, the more opportunities we create for 
borderline cases to arise” (Kaplan 1964, p. 65). 
For constructs that are associated with empirical 
observations (directly or indirectly), we can only 
know whether or not such constructs apply to a 
particular empirical setting after the empirical 
setting is identified. Therefore, if we cannot 
identify all the possible empirical settings in which 
a construct will be used, we cannot specify all the 
range of possible empirical observations to which 
the construct applies. This difficulty leads to the 
fact that the meaning of a construct cannot be fully 
or comprehensively specified prior to knowing its 
uses. 
Perceived ease of use refers to 
“the degree to which a person 
believes that using a particular 
system would be free of effort” 
(Davis 1989, p. 320). This 
construct is subject to further 
discrimination when encountering 
borderline instances of “system” 
or “effort” in a new setting. 
Theoretical issue: The 
meaning of a construct 
can only be specified 
together with a set of 
other constructs. 
Because a theoretical construct’s meaning is 
given by the theory where the construct emerges, 
when specifying the meaning of a theoretical 
construct, one often ends up with specifying all the 
other related constructs in the theory. 
To understand “appropriations of 
technology”, which refer to “the 
immediate, visible actions that 
evidence deeper structuration 
processes” (DeSanctis and Poole 
1994, p. 128), one must first 
specify the meaning of “a 
structuration process” or the 
critical differences between “use 
as designed” and “use in action”. 
Temporal issue: The 
meaning of a construct 
will become 
increasingly unclear 
with the growth of 
knowledge. 
Because the meaning of a construct is specified 
with an eye to existing contexts and understanding 
of things in the world. With the growth of 
knowledge, both contexts and understanding of 
things change. As a result, the meaning of a 
construct will become unfit for considering new 
contexts and new understanding of things. 
The meaning of system usage is 
modified as primary users of a 
system change from technical 
experts, who use a system for 
computing intensive tasks, to all 
employees of an organization, 
most of who have a low level of 
technical skills and use a system 
for handling their daily work.  
 
 4.  A Systematic Approach to Conceptualization 
In this section, we introduce a systematic approach to conceptualization. Table 2 
summarizes the approach to conceptualization, which consists roughly of six steps. 
Researchers should follow the steps where appropriate conditions are satisfied. It is also 
noteworthy that researchers should consider these steps in an iterative way rather than a 
strictly linear fashion. Hence, one can return to prior steps when desired effects do not 
emerge. 
 
Table 2. Summary of a Systematic Approach to Conceptualization 
Step Activities 
1. Define the goal of 
conceptualization; 
• Articulate the possible uses of the intended conceptualization; 
• Specify the intended types of conceptualization; 
2. Construct a content universe for the 
focal phenomenon; 
• Search for closely related conceptualizations and develop a 
content universe; 
• Clarify the relationships among all the closely related 
conceptualizations; 
3. Consider the “whole” of 
conceptualization; 
• Theorize reference theories where the conceptualization 
arises; 
• Explicate underlying assumptions essential to the 
conceptualization; 
4. Consider the “parts” of 
conceptualization; 
• To improve the effectiveness of conceptualization, consider 
replacing Facet A with Facet B and Facet C; 
• To improve the efficiency of conceptualization, consider 
replacing Facet A and Facet B with Facet C; 
• Replace Facet A with Facet B; 
• Adjust elements of Facet A; 
5. Identify a useful definition for the 
conceptualization; 
• Consider a short summary statement of the conceptualization; 
• Refine the definition; 
6. Evaluate the conceptualization 
against the goal; 
• Evaluate the adequacy of the conceptualization; 
• Evaluate the complexity of the conceptualization; 
• Return to any of the previous steps if necessary; 
4.1.  Step 1: Define the Goal of Conceptualization 
First of all, researchers should tentatively articulate the possible uses of the intended 
conceptualization. The meaning of a construct cannot escape from its intended use or goal. 
This use performs a specific function in the context of the occurrence of a construct (Kaplan 
1964). Kaplan (1964) recognized that every construct functions as “a rule of judging or 
acting, a prescription for organizing the materials of experience so as to be able to go on 
about our business” (Kaplan 1964, p. 46). Hence, the meaning of a construct is useful or 
scientifically valid “only if what they [researchers] intend by it [the construct] becomes actual: 
problems are solved and intentions are fulfilled [as a consequence of using the construct]” 
(Kaplan 1964, p. 46). Although we cannot know all the possible uses of a construct before it 
is actually used, what remains critically important is that we clarify the various roles a 
 construct might play and ensure the conceptualization is consistent with the role specified 
(Kaplan 1964). 
Because different kinds of construct play distinctive roles in research, researchers should 
specify the intended types of construct in accord with the intended uses. Table 3 considers 
several types of construct used in the IS discipline. 
Umbrella constructs3 are abbreviations or labels that serve as a shorthand for a set of 
substantive constructs. Hirsch and Levin (1999) referred to “umbrella constructs” as “broad 
concepts used to encompass and account for a diverse set of phenomena” (p. 199). Well-
known examples of umbrella constructs in the IS literature include “IS success” (DeLone and 
McLean 1992) and “IT capabilities” (Sambamurthy et al. 2003). Others (e.g., Polites et al. 
2012; Edwards 2001) referred to “umbrella constructs” with the name “multidimensional 
constructs”. 
 
Table 3. Taxonomy of Construct Types 
Type of Construct Example 
Umbrella (or multidimensional) constructs are abbreviations or labels 
that serve as a shorthand for a set of substantive constructs. 
IS success (DeLone and McLean 
1992); IT capabilities (Sambamurthy et 
al. 2003); 
Substantive (or unidimensional) 
constructs are constructs that 
mirror or interpret certain 
aspects of reality and have 
empirical basis. 
Empirical constructs are constructs 
that can be directly observed or that 
can be inferred from simple 
observations. 
Perceived ease of use and perceived 
usefulness, of technology (Davis 
1989); user information satisfaction 
(Ives et al. 1983); 
Theoretical constructs are constructs 
that can only be meaningful when 
used together with other constructs in 
a theory to describe complex 
observations. 
Appropriation of technology (DeSantis 
and Poole 1994); functional 
affordances (Markus and Silver 2008); 
 
Without relating to a set of substantive constructs, an umbrella construct by itself does not 
point to any substantive meaning and, thus, can be replaced by a different symbol (e.g., “x” 
or “β”). Nonetheless, by grouping a set of substantive constructs, an umbrella construct may 
bypass some burdensome processes of thinking (Kaplan 1964) and may allow more succinct 
explanations of phenomena (Polites et al. 2012).  
It is noteworthy that constructs are not naturally multidimensional or unidimensional (Polites 
et al. 2012). Increasing the dimensionality may help researchers to engage more deeply with 
the nature of a phenomenon. However, finer distinctions of a phenomenon may be difficult to 
understand or use. A balance between depth and dimensionality needs to be considered. 
Substantive constructs can be further distinguished as “empirical constructs” and “theoretical 
constructs” (Kaplan 1964). Empirical constructs include constructs “whose application rests 
on relatively simple and direct observations” (Kaplan 1964, p. 54). For example, the colour of 
an object is directly observable. In contrast, empirical constructs also include constructs 
“whose application calls for relatively more subtle, complex, or indirect observations, in which 
inferences play an acknowledged part” (Kaplan 1964, p. 55); “such inferences concern 
presumed connections, usually causal, between what is directly observed and what the term 
[a construct] signifies” (Kaplan 1964, p. 55). For example, the weight of an object cannot be 
directly observed, but instead can be inferred from the total amount of standard kilograms 
that are used to balance the object. Lastly, empirical constructs include those constructs, 
“which, though not observational either directly or indirectly, may be applied and even 
                                                
3 We adopted the term “umbrella constructs” following Hirsch and Levin (1999), because we believe this term best 
represents our intended meaning with the term. Kaplan’s (1964) “notational terms” are consistent with the use of 
“umbrella constructs” herein. 
 defined on the basis of the observables” (Kaplan 1964, p. 55). “They are definable at least in 
principle by observables, though in practice we may give them only partial and perhaps 
shifting anchorage in concreta” (Kaplan 1964, pp. 56). For example, perceived ease of use of 
a technology cannot be observed either directly or indirectly. Instead, researchers apply this 
construct to empirical settings based on users’ responses to a set of questions, which can be 
observed. 
In contrast to empirical constructs, theoretical constructs cannot be defined by observables. 
The “meaning [of a theoretical construct] derives from the part that it plays in the whole 
theory in which it is embedded, and from the role of the theory itself” (Kaplan 1964, p. 56). 
Kaplan (1964, p. 57) noted, 
A theoretical term [construct] has systemic meaning: to discover what it is up to 
we must be prepared to send not a single spy but whole battalions. This systemic 
quality is what makes the analysis of theoretical terms [constructs] so difficult: 
what begins as the effort to fix the content of a single concept ends as the task of 
assessing the truth of a whole theory. (Kaplan 1964, p. 57) 
Given that a theoretical construct has systemic meaning, “a paradox of conceptualization” 
exists (Kaplan 1964): 
The proper concepts are needed to formulate a good theory, but we need a good 
theory to arrive at the proper concepts. […] Every taxonomy is a provisional and 
implicit theory (or family of theories). As knowledge of a particular subject-matter 
grows, our conception of that subject-matter changes; as our concepts become 
more fitting, we learn more and more. Like all existential dilemmas in science, of 
which this is an instance, the paradox is resolved by a process of approximation: 
the better our concepts, the better the theory we can formulate with them, and in 
turn, the better the concepts available for the next, improved theory. (Kaplan 
1964, pp. 53 – 54) 
Although the distinction between empirical constructs and theoretical constructs drawn by 
Kaplan (1964) provides insights into the different kinds of constructs, the boundaries 
between these different kinds of constructs are usually fuzzy. 
The basic point is that no observation is purely empirical¬¬—that is, free of any 
ideational element—as no theory (in science, at any rate) is purely ideational. 
The same point might be put in this way, that the human being is himself an 
instrument of observation and requires, like other instruments, a theory for its 
proper use. What is involved is more than a matter of dealing with the errors of 
the “human equation” […]. (Kaplan 1964, pp. 58 – 59) 
In short, the line between the observational and the theoretical is differently 
drawn according to the purposes and contexts of our reconstruction of the logic-
in-use. As inquiry proceeds, the invention of new instruments, the growth of 
knowledge of empirical connections, the incorporation of well-established theory 
into the conceptual frame of emerging problems—all affect the placing of this line 
[…]. (Kaplan 1964, p. 59) 
This is sensible when one considers the perceived ease of use of a technology, which may 
be classified as “not observational either directly or indirectly”. However, some researchers 
might argue they observe the construct through a questionnaire instrument, suggesting that 
perceived ease of use is indirectly observational. 
4.2.  Step 2: Construct a Content Universe 
Constructs in essence are categories of real or constructed things. Meanings are assigned to 
such categories through a process of conceptualization, in which “the things studied are 
classified and analysed: several things are grouped together and particular things assigned 
to the several groups to which they belong” (Kaplan 1964, p. 50).  
 Ontologically, a Facet-Theoretical View can characterize the connection of a focal construct 
to other related constructs (Zhang et al. 2016). A facet refers to an attribute of a construct 
and consists of elements that characterize the different possible values of the facet. These 
values describe the potential variants of the attribute.  
For example, consider three constructs related to satisfaction: user satisfaction (Wixom and 
Todd 2005), user information satisfaction (Ives et al. 1983), and end-user computing 
satisfaction (Doll and Torkzadeh 1988). User satisfaction refers to “the attitude that a user 
has toward an information system” (Wixom and Todd 2005, p. 87), whereas user information 
satisfaction is defined as “the extent to which users believe the information system available 
to them meets their information requirements” (Ives et al. 1983, p. 785). End-user computing 
satisfaction refers to “the affective attitude towards a specific computer application by 
someone who interacts with the application directly” (Doll and Torkzadeh 1988, p. 261). If the 
three constructs were under scrutiny, they are considered comprising a content universe of 
study. Despite variances in details, the three constructs share a skeleton: they all describe 
an evaluative response toward some evaluative target (Melone 1990; Muylle et al. 2004). 
Accordingly, two facets might be distilled: “evaluative response” and “evaluative target” (see 
Table 4). “Evaluative response” includes two elements of “attitude” and “belief”, whereas 
“evaluative target” includes two elements of “information system” and “computer application”. 
Although other facets might be usefully identified (e.g., “evaluative stakeholder” with the 
elements of “user”, “senior manager”, “developer”, “vendor”, and “consultant”), the three 
constructs of user satisfaction, user information satisfaction, and end-user computing 
satisfaction can be distinguished based only on the elements of “evaluative response” and 
“evaluative target” (see Table 4). 
 
Table 4. Example of Facet and Element (reproduced from Zhang et al. [2016, p. 6]) 
Facet and Element  
Specification within a Content Universe 
User 
Satisfaction 
User 
Information 
Satisfaction 
End-User Computing 
Satisfaction 
Facet A: Evaluative response (with the elements of 
“attitude” [denoted as A[1]] and “belief” [denoted as 
A[2]] 
A[1]: Attitude A[2]: Belief A[1]: Attitude 
Facet B: Evaluative target (with the elements of 
“information system” [denoted as B[1]] and “computer 
application” [denoted as B[2]] 
B[1]: 
Information 
System 
B[1]: 
Information 
System 
B[2]: Computer 
Application 
 
Researchers should search for constructs that are closely related to the focal phenomenon of 
interest and develop a content universe of all the related constructs from a Facet-Theoretical 
View. When developing a content universe, it is necessary to clarify the relationships among 
all the closely related conceptualizations according to the essential facets and elements of 
facets. Seven principles can be used to guide the development of a content universe (Zhang 
et al. 2016). Drawing from our previous example of satisfaction we illustrate in detail the set 
of principles. 
 
Principle 1: Constructs in a content universe should be specified in terms of all 
relevant facets. 
It is important to ensure that every construct within a content universe is specified by all 
relevant facets. For the illustrative example, each of user satisfaction, user information 
satisfaction, and end-user computing satisfaction must be specified by all of the facets – in 
this case, evaluative response and evaluative target. In practice, this is often carried out 
through a systematic search and analysis of the literature. For example, to specify all the 
 relevant facets for the construct of “task”, Li and Belkin (2008, pp. 1833 – 1835) initially 
identified related facets used explicitly or implicitly in extant literature, then categorized these 
facets, and lastly merged redundant facets. 
 
Principle 2: The facets, collectively, should be logically exhaustive of the content 
universe. 
The exhaustiveness criterion for facets is met if and only if including an additional facet will 
not achieve any further distinction of constructs in the content universe. This means the 
criterion of exhaustiveness can be a stopping point for searching for new facets. Assume we 
did not define evaluative target facet in the illustrative example; user satisfaction and end-
user computing satisfaction are characterized as the same by existing facets. By defining the 
additional facet of evaluative target, user satisfaction and end-user computing satisfaction 
can be further distinguished. We can therefore conclude that the set of facets that contains 
only evaluative response is not exhaustive for the content universe consisting of these three 
constructs. In contrast, both facets of evaluative response and evaluative target are 
exhaustive, because all three constructs in this content universe are already distinguished 
from each other; any attempt to include more facets would not achieve further distinction. 
 
Principle 3: The logical relationships among facets should be specified; independence 
among facets is preferred. 
Relationships among facets must be clearly specified. It is preferred that facets are logically 
independent of each other; such a group of facets is most efficient (McGrath 1968). 
Independence means the determination of an element in any facet will not affect the 
determination of an element in another facet. If the independence criterion were violated, 
there would exist so-called “null cells” (in a cross-reference of all facets in multidimensional 
space) that would never be referenced (McGrath 1968).  
Again, using the illustrative example, assume we have defined an additional facet, called 
theoretical level, characterizing the level of theory to which the generalization of the construct 
is manifested (Kozlowski and Klein 2000). We further assume this facet has two elements, 
individual level and organizational level. This facet is not independent of the evaluative 
response facet, because when attitude is used to characterize constructs, by implication the 
individual level will always be used. In this example, the combination of attitude and 
organizational level will thus never be used to characterize any existing or potential 
constructs (here, we assume a collective’s attitude is no longer an attitude, but another type 
of evaluative response). The inclusion of theoretical level as a new facet will thus result in 
possible null cells. Null cells indicate inefficient use of facets and are undesirable. Parsimony 
or simplicity can be gained from efficient usage of facets. 
 
Principle 4: Each facet should be analysed into a set of collectively exhaustive 
elements. 
Elements within a facet should also be exhaustive. This exhaustiveness criterion for 
elements is met if and only if each construct in the content universe can be characterized by 
at least one element in each facet. Consider another variation of the illustrative example, 
where the evaluative response facet has only the one element, attitude. In such a case, the 
set of elements for evaluative response facet is not exhaustive, because user information 
satisfaction cannot be characterized by any element in the evaluative response facet. In 
contrast, it is exhaustive only when evaluative response facet includes both elements of 
attitude and belief. 
 
Principle 5: Each facet should be analysed into a set of mutually exclusive elements. 
 In addition to exhaustiveness, the elements in any facet must be mutually exclusive, such 
that each construct in a content universe can be characterized by only one element of any 
given facet. For example, all three constructs of user satisfaction, user information 
satisfaction, and end-user computing satisfaction, can be exclusively characterized by either 
attitude or belief of evaluative response facet (never both). The elements in evaluative 
response facet are thus mutually exclusive. 
 
Principle 6: The logical relationships among elements of a facet should be specified. 
Relationships among elements of a facet must be clearly specified. There are several 
possibilities. For the evaluative target facet in the illustrative example, a hierarchical order of 
elements could exist, such as computer application and information system, ranked from 
lower to higher level of analysis. Alternatively, the relationship between these two elements 
could be specified as inclusive – information system consists of computer application and 
other parts. The relationship among elements must be justifiable to the extent the purpose of 
the research is satisfied.  
 
Principle 7: The relationships among the constructs defined according to the facets 
and the elements of facets should correspond to the focal phenomenon. 
How can we know or assess the usefulness of facets and elements used? McGrath (1968) 
suggested “the principle of concordance or contiguity” for evaluating the usefulness of facets 
and elements. He (McGrath 1968, p. 197) argued, 
Regardless of the purpose of the system or the nature of the objects to be 
classified, though, it seems clear that the major aim of any a priori classification 
ought to be to order the objects in terms of their logical properties in such a way 
as to be predictive of their ordering on (meaningful) empirical properties. 
Constructs that are theorized to be alike should also be empirically alike (McGrath 1968). In 
the illustrative example, user satisfaction and end-user computing satisfaction are different 
on the evaluative target facet, whereas user information satisfaction and end-user computing 
satisfaction are different on both the evaluative response and the evaluative target facets. 
The relationships among constructs or their “likeness” should be expected from empirical 
observations. End-user computing satisfaction can be interpreted as more “like” user 
satisfaction than user information satisfaction (by assuming equal contribution of every facet 
to “likeness”). Note that there might be other ways to operationalize “likeness”. 
We adapted McGrath’s (1968) “principle of concordance or contiguity” to accommodate 
diverse views. In particular, we believe that it is unnecessary to constrain the target 
constructs to those emphasizing empirical prediction; instead, for constructs that do not 
emphasize strong empirical prediction or “mirroring reality” (e.g., metaphysical or linguistic 
constructs such as “dilemma”, “paradox”, “system”, “adaptation”, and “punctuated 
equilibrium”), the researcher may examine consistency between a definitional framework and 
an interpretation of the focal phenomenon. The usefulness of facets and elements can be 
verified through the process in which the constructs are continuously used by a group of 
researchers. 
4.3.  Step 3: Consider the “Whole” of Conceptualization 
Based on the Facet-Theoretical View two general strategies can be adopted in the process 
of conceptualization: consider the whole and consider the parts. When one considers a 
conceptualization as a whole, dramatic revision may occur, where one or more assumptions 
underlying the conceptualization might be displaced, resulting in change of a large set of 
facets or elements of facets. 
 The researcher first needs to search for existing reference theories that might be related to 
the focal phenomenon. This literature search should comprehensively cover how the 
construct has been used in prior literature. The outcome is a list of reference theories, each 
of which captures some aspects of the phenomenon. 
The researcher should next explicate all of the underlying assumptions that are brought to 
the focal phenomenon by the reference theories. Table 5 illustrates some possible 
assumptions related to conceptualization of use. 
 
Table 5. Types of Assumptions Related to Conceptualization of “Use” 
Type Content 
Ontological  Decision-Making School User behaviours are determined primarily by technology 
properties as designed (DeSanctis and Poole 1994). 
Socio-Technological 
School 
User behaviours are jointly influenced by technology properties 
as designed and the social structures of human interaction 
brought by the technology (DeSanctis and Poole 1994). 
Institutional School Technology may drive organizational change through influencing 
the social structures of human interaction (DeSanctis and Poole 
1994). 
Observational  Conscious Behaviour Users often consciously evaluate a technology based on his or 
her experience of use and thereafter make well-informed 
decisions to use or adopt the technology (Jasperson et al. 2005). 
Unconscious Behaviour Users often follow others to use or adopt a technology or 
continue to use the technology based on his or her existing habit 
of use (Jasperson et al. 2005). 
 
After carefully evaluating the reasonableness of each reference theory and its associated 
assumptions, the researcher should make a decision regarding which set of assumptions to 
retain based on their representativeness of the focal phenomenon. For instance, Jasperson 
et al. (2005) argued that the assumption of conscious behaviour is more suitable for settings 
where users have control over the choice of technology, whereas the assumption of 
unconscious behaviour is more suitable for settings where users have already adopted and 
learned a technology. 
Because modification of relevant research assumptions may lead to modification of facets 
and elements of facets, after evaluating the appropriateness of the choice of research 
assumptions, researchers should consider whether the choice of assumptions indeed results 
in the associated set of facets or elements of facets being retained or replaced. 
4.4.  Step 4: Consider the “Parts” of Conceptualization 
When one considers the parts of a conceptualization, progressive or more incremental 
revision is more likely. Change thus occurs at the granularity of a facet or an element of a 
facet.  
In particular, there are several possibilities. To improve the effectiveness of a 
conceptualization, researchers may consider replacing one facet with another two or more 
facets. To improve the efficiency of a conceptualization, researchers may consider replacing 
two or more facets with fewer facets. Additionally, researchers may replace one facet with 
another facet or adjust elements of a facet. Collectively, these possibilities help researchers 
to consider mindfully the appropriateness and value of every facet and element of facet. 
 4.5.  Step 5: Identify a Useful Definition for the Conceptualization 
Although a definitional sentence may only capture partial meaning of a construct, a definition 
is useful in providing a succinct summary of the meaning such that the construct can be 
relatively easily referenced. Suddaby (2010) suggested that a good definition should 
“effectively capture the essential properties and characteristics of the concept or 
phenomenon under consideration, … avoid tautology or circularity, … [and] be parsimonious” 
(p. 347). MacKenzie et al. (2011) similarly noted the importance of identifying essential 
properties in a definitional statement. We further recommend that the researcher may 
characterize all the facets discerned in prior steps and the elements specified through a 
sentence in a meaningful way; however, it does not follow that the labels of those facets or 
elements need to appear in the sentence (e.g., the word “belief” does not have to appear in 
the definition for “user information satisfaction”). 
4.6.  Step 6: Evaluate the Conceptualization against the Goal 
A conceptualization needs to be evaluated against its goal in order to understand the 
adequacy of the conceptualization. This evaluation can be carried out, by consulting 
colleagues or experts in the relevant area. It is also recommended to explain the 
conceptualization to a person without relevant expertise to assess whether the 
conceptualization could be easily understood. Where any of the goals is not satisfied, 
researchers may consider returning to previous steps and continue to improve the 
conceptualization. 
It is also noteworthy that a conceptualization should achieve a balance between clarity and 
complexity. When engaging with developing a nuanced conceptualization, researchers often 
become immersed in many initially complex theoretical and conceptual issues, over time 
achieving understanding, and thereafter often losing sight of how complex those issues could 
be to other researchers. Where a conceptualization becomes extremely precise in capturing 
a highly abstract phenomenon, the conceptualization may risk being overly complex or 
difficult to access (to the uninitiated). As a consequence, the conceptualization might not be 
used in research practice. If a balance between clarity and complexity is not achieved, it is 
useful to return to previous steps and consider whether all the details are essential to convey 
core ideas of a conceptualization. 
 
 
5.  Discussion 
The proposed approach focuses on progressive improvement of conceptualization based on 
prior literature. It is assumed that often one or more closely related conceptualizations exist. 
Additionally, researchers should consider an appropriate degree of vagueness suitable for 
the intended uses of the conceptualization. As noted by Weick (1999), a certain level of 
vagueness may enable a conceptualization to be applied to a broader range of phenomena 
and may spark creativity such that the conceptualization is more likely to be appropriated or 
extended for novel uses. Further, given the omnipresence of vagueness (Kaplan 1964), 
clarification of meaning must cease until the goal of the conceptualization is fulfilled. 
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